Abstract
Information systems (IS) design researchers have rightly accorded Herbert Simon's book The Sciences of the Artificial (1996) a position of centrality in the discipline, a discipline that previous editions of Simon's book actually helped define (Hevner at al. 2004; Walls et al. 1992) . The book's roots are in engineering and technical design (hence The Sciences of the Artificial), but Simon recognized that the intellectual content of designing as a social activity marked professional training and preparation more broadly, including law and business.
Elsewhere in the book Simon (1996) devotes a whole chapter to what he variously calls "social planning" and "human design", where his focus is with "characteristics and complexities of designing artifacts on a societal scale". Such artifacts include the US Marshall Plan, the US Constitution, social policies generally, and urban planning projects. Motivated by visions of a "humane society", social design projects tend to be large in ambition and extended in their timescale and, given "our limited ability to foretell or determine the future", they may have no finite end goals except to provide for future flexibility so that they may "evolve" toward desired futures.
Social design has received little attention in IS design research. I seek to correct this here by considering the design of artifacts like IT-based civic networks and electronic governance systems --a class of IS that purport to be in the public interest whose design, use and evolution are matters typically of societal concern (or at least the concern of segments of a society or social community). Such projects, I argue, are probably better conceptualized as democratic social design projects, and I go beyond Simon to define such projects and illuminate their distinctive characteristics from the standpoint of liberal democratic theorizing. Along the way, I critique IS design theorizing as inadequate to study such projects. I then outline a framework for thinking about first order social design, which concerns design of the social organization of design activity. To a greater or lesser degree, democratic social design efforts tend to involve designers in their social role as citizens, as actors who, in addition to their own selfish interest may be assumed to share a conception of the common good they purport to realize through the IS artifact. Drawing on constructivist and institutional theorizing in sociology among others, I start below with a particular view of rationality peculiar to ideals of democratic citizenship. Next, I propose a model of the actor (designer) and action 1 that I posit are necessary to theorize about democratic social design projects. Given these models, I note that the first object of design should be constitutive -the social organization of design activity itself. This I call first order design. I then advance some first order design principles, theory/theories, and guidelines applicable to democratic social design projects (hereafter social design refers to such projects). My focus is normative as well as pragmatic and empirical, and the framework is intended to inform theorizing as well as action in IS design settings.
Social Design Project Characteristics
Philosophers have argued that notions of the common good and public interest stand for the interests that people have in their role as democratic citizens. For example Pettit (2004) notes that "whatever a person's interests as a citizen, they will be the same…as those of anyone else, considered as a citizen" (p. 158) and that the public interest reflects "those interests which people have in common" as citizens (p. 159) . This is the first characteristic of social design projects, that they are the work of citizens.
The economic model of complete rationality assumes a human decision-maker who is "supremely" skilled at picking optimal courses of action that advance his self-interest. This depiction of economic man -homo economicus -has been criticized as a "caricature" (Krugman 1995) , sometimes by economists themselves. However, social scientists also do acknowledge that the model has utility in predicting behavior in certain limited decision contexts (Ostrom 1998) . In contrast to complete rationality, Simon's (1996) well-known formulation of bounded rationality (BR) assumes more realistically that "environmental complexity" can overwhelm the human actor's computational resources and that the actor, considering the cost of pursuing an optimal course of action (time and attention budgets), was more likely to satisfice instead by going with the option he believed was good enough under the conditions. Despite their differences complete rationality and BR share a common concern, modeling decisions as resulting from "evaluation of alternatives in terms of their consequences" for personal preferences (March 1994) . In other words, both are consequentialist in their orientation.
Democratic theorizing on citizenship favors a different depiction -persons as homo reciprocans (Fehr and Gachter 1998) . Citizens are persons who are willing to think and act not as members of a particular interest group or out of selfish interest but rather in the public interest, "as members of the community as a whole" (March and Olsen 2004) . The pragmatic philosopher John Rawls (1980) elegantly develops his idea of the reasonable, which fits well with the role of citizen and the spirit of citizenship: the reasonable actor is one who is willing to abide by "fair terms of cooperation" in his interactions with others and is moved by values of reciprocity, fairness, and propriety. Further, the reasonable and the rational (denoting economic man) are both distinctive and necessary "capacities central to our reasoning" (Rawls 1980) , with the first oriented to an enduring moral capacity deriving from our identity as citizens and from our sense of the common good and stemming from a recognition that, as members of social collectives, our own well-being is tied up with that of the larger whole. In contrast, the rational derives from an amoral drive for utility maximization and fulfillment of selfish interests (Clements and Hauptmann 2002; also Selznick 1992) . Rawls (1980) goes on to delineate the relation between these two "capacities", noting that the reasonable pre-supposes the rational because, absent self-interest, actors would have no reason to want to co-operate, but that it subordinates the rational by limiting the play of self-interest in collective choice.
The second characteristic of social design projects is that they typically involve not one designer but many. Arguably, public interest initiatives should involve representatives from diverse social groups, bodies and sponsoring organizations. The scale and scope of the project may make it infeasible to be undertaken by a singular designer. While it may be assumed that these designers are involved in the project in their role as citizens (if they did not share some notion of the common good why would they be involved in the project at all?), they may also be "seeking to further their own interests", as Simon (1996) acknowledged. Conflict must be anticipated in such collective efforts when actors' self interests clash with the public interest, when their role as private persons tied to a formal organization and its corporate values and priorities comes into conflict with their persona as citizens. This tension is at the heart of all social dilemmas in social design. In contrast, IS design projects usually involve a unitary organizational sponsor where the designers are drawn from the same sponsoring organization (see Hevner et al. 2004) , with the result that we get no purchase on such dilemmas. Methodological individualism (itself a legacy of rational choice), neglect of the collective dimension of design and consequently of social conflict are among the limitations of IS design theorizing stemming from an under-socialized view of the actor and of action, as I elaborate below.
The third characteristic of social design projects is their commitment to a "humane society" (Simon 1996) . From a liberal democratic stance, this embodies a commitment to social justice (Rawls 1980 ) and a faith in the "role of individual and collective human reason" in pursuing social and political equality for all (March and Olsen 2004) . Humane society in the democratic sense is the work of citizens, who as such are assumed to have a desire individually and collectively to design institutions as the means to achieve egalitarian ends. If the rational is the human capacity associated with the consequentialist logic of individuals in their role as private entities, the reasonable is the capacity relative to the non-consequentialist logic of appropriateness in their role as citizens. While some (e.g., Wendt 2001) have argued that the logic of appropriateness begets "normatively appropriate" action oriented toward moral aims and deriving its legitimacy solely from these aims, others are more cautious. To act appropriately, note March and Olsen (2004) , "is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual and often tacit understanding of what is true, reasonable, good. The term logic of appropriateness has overtones of morality (but)…the terms itself does not guarantee…moral acceptability". So, to qualify the term in light of the foregoing, my use of the non-consequentialist logic of appropriateness below is normatively-toned with reference to citizenship and refers to social practices -specifically design practices --reflective of the reasonable capacity in human beings in their role as democratic citizens. Rawls (1980) sees the rational and the reasonable as human capacities. Consistent with this but more useful in the empirical sense is March and Olsen's (2004) formulation, where actors act "appropriately" by matching the social situation they are in to behavioral rules they invoke consistent with their role in that setting. In social design projects, the empirically interesting questions thus are: which social role -that of democratic citizen (incorporating the reasonable capacity and the logic of appropriateness) or private person (incorporating the rational capacity and consequentialist logic) --do actors accent in the design setting, by what social process and under what normative conditions do rules become actions, and with what effects on the artifact? These questions stem from a particular conception of the actor and of action informed by sociological institutional theory.
Modeling Actors and Actions
IS design research offers no articulated account of the actor or of action. What we can glean from the extant theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Hevner et al., 2004; Walls et al., 1992 ) is under-socialized at least in two ways. Actors are (necessarily) social in that they need to cooperate with others to realize their interests. Simon (1996) notes that humans are not monads ("hermetically sealed particles") but social beings, whose ability to realize their goals "is tightly linked" up with their social interactions. This is the weaker sense of the term social. In the stronger sense, an adequately socialized characterization of actors acknowledges that their "identity --and their very conception of what their interests ought to be -is shaped by the institutions of society" (Bellah et al., 1991) . IS design studies offer actors who are socially-indeterminate, whose sense of self apparently is entirely constituted by the organization and its institutions. They are assumed to inhabit their organizationally-assigned roles without reflexivity or irony, which means they also act in the scripted (prescribed) ways. Such a depiction (this is a default model probably unintended by IS analysts) sits poorly even with design research traditions in proximate cognate disciplines like systems engineering and product design (Bucciarelli 1994; Vinck 2003) .
Drawing on sociological institutionalist theorizing, I hold that persons -their identities and interests -are shaped by institutions. Seeking cultural explanations for social phenomena lends sociological institutional theorizing its "theoretical distinctiveness" (Tolbert and Zucker 1996) . Sociologists understand institutions as cultural abstractions (e.g., capitalism), each with its distinctive set of logics (e.g., profit-seeking). These logics -defined as "symbolic constructions and material practices" (Friedland and Alford 1991) -furnish the legitimating foundations for values, norms and interests that define an organization and locate its roles, rules, and practices in its institutional space, that is, in its industry or sector (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) . Actors affiliated with the organization come to assume its values, norms, interests via socialization. Their routine role behavior, as organizational insiders, according to the dynamic of structuration (Ranson et al., 1980) , reproduces the organization and assures its persistence over time.
Such a conception of the actor runs the risk of being over-socialized. Proponents of the repertoire model of culture in sociological institutional theorizing note that actors may be concurrently embedded -socializedin multiple institutions, which may only fit imperfectly, resulting in internal contradictions and tensions in the actor (DiMaggio 1997). Even actors sharing organizational affiliation may, by virtue of their functional responsibilities and differences in professional background and occupational socialization, entertain "local" commitments that they do not share with their organizational colleagues, giving them access to values and interests -as also norms and identities -that may be more or less consistent with those of the organization. Actors' socialization in any set of institutional logics may be less than perfect, resulting in "slippage" from prescribed courses of thought and action. The repertoire view is favored by sociological institutionalists and corrects the over-socialized model. It also argues that actors are not automatons -or organizational dupes --blindly enacting prescribed scripts but are persons capable of agency, actors who may select and activate a role and a set of rules from their repertoire based on an assessment of their appropriateness for the situation they find themselves in and on the cues therein (DiMaggio 1997).
Nominally, IS design research is "social" in the weaker sense of the term, in that designers work with the prospective user or users of the system over the course of its development, interact with project sponsors, reference relevant other projects, deal with vendors and service providers (see, for example, Markus et al., 2002; Vaishnavi and Kuechler n.d.) . But we get little intimation of the collective's (the project team) inner life, its struggles around questions of identity, interests and values as we would from a nuanced account of collective design work. How is consensus achieved when even "technical" issues like system performance specifications "are not given…but are mutually constructed and maintained" by the collective (Bucciarelli 1994 ). The result is methodological individualism where the actor --or the unarticulated collective lumped together --is the unit of analysis and collective phenomena are analyzed in terms of aggregated "individual choices and motives" (Bardhan and Ray 2008) . Collectives can be more, and frequently also less, than their constituents. Matters like collective identity can be "chronically contested, as groups vie to produce social representations favorable to their … interests" (DiMaggio 1997). Solidarity and identity cannot be assumed but must be explained.
If consequentialist action is motivated by the actor's preferences, appropriate actions are role-based and institutionally-informed. Institutions "instruct and guide…actors with reflexive depictions of their proper roles. They provide…recipes for activity routines…" (Meyer 1986 ). In competitive situations, institutions can determine what values and interests prevail and which ones lose out (March and Olsen 2004) . March (1994) elegantly links identity, rules, and situations in his formulation: "an identity is a conception of self organized into rules for matching action to situations". Actors' assessment of the appropriateness of their response to the situation is not assumed to be perfect and may be colored by the fact that some values and interests -as well as roles and rules -may be more "available" to the actor, in the cognitive sense, than others (DiMaggio 1997). And actors' behaviors are informed by their interpretation of the situation, which itself is assumed to be institutionally-shaped. The actor is constrained in the sense that social phenomena falling outside the scope of his institutional repertoire may make no sense to him. But he is also an agent, with a capacity to choose identities and rules, norms, values and interests to activate in a setting, to match his choices to contingencies therein.
Institutions shape action in two ways, one proscriptive and the other prescriptive. First, they implicitly or explicitly proscribe certain courses of action while encouraging "self-imposition" by actors of behavioral discipline -the need for which may be overtly or latently communicated through the sanctioned roles and rules --to resist such behavior (Offe 1996) . This negative function, which the collective voluntarily adopts as part of first order design, has been likened to Ulysses binding himself to the mast of his ship to resist the tempting call of the sirens. Second, and more positively, institutions provide actors with examples of "right action", and again these may be communicated overtly or latently through roles and rules. Both functions instantiate social controls through "regulative institutions" to ensure that individual practices are in accord with collective demands (Coser 1982) .
If, as noted above, collective identity is often contested, it follows that collective action -assumed to flow from a more or less solidaristic sense of self -is also problematic and must be explained. Collective action stems from subjective constructions that influence accounts of which "objective facts in the world" demand action and what that action ought to consist of (Wendt 2001) . What phenomena are identified as a problem and how they are categorized -these are social constructions that shape collective action. Writing about a particular engineering design problem (photocopier dropout), Bucciarelli (1994) notes: "to what extent is…"dropout" a social construction? The view here is that because participants espouse different interests…the reconciliation of these differences in the definition of the problem is not unique in any...scientific way. Dropout, as a problem, is a social construction" (p. 163).
Actors, I noted above, are agents. As such, they are assumed to be able to not merely to choose from among available alternatives but to actively construct them. A constructivist viewpoint, shared by both sociological institutionalists and pragmatic philosophers (like Rawls), argues against a position common to conceptions of Homo Economicus: actors are assumed to know their own preferences, that these are exogenous, "given" and stable over time, and that they are unvarying from one situation to the next (Bardhan and Ray 2008) . A more nuanced account is given by constructivism. Analysts in these traditions focus attention on the social circumstances in which collectives do their work and in which determinations of individual and collective conceptions of self, values and interests, and individual and collective actions, must be analyzed. Crucially, these are assumed to be not merely selectively activated from an available repertoire but that actors actively discover, invent, and construct them as the situation warrants.
Recall the characteristics of social design projects. They involve: actors qua citizens, multiple sponsoring organizations with diverse interests and values, and democratic aims. Given these characteristics, and given a socialized conception of actors and actions -a conception that is "social" in both weak and strong senses of the term -we can direct inquiry by asking: which role -that of democratic citizen or private person --do actors activate in the design situation, by what social process and under what normative conditions do rules become actions, with what consequences for the design product? These empirical questions also double as a pragmatic concern: can we design democratic structures and resources so as to increase the likelihood that designers will duly activate their citizen role, that the social processes (and procedures) used and prevailing normative conditions respect liberal democratic desiderata such as transparency and publicity, deliberation and public reason and so realize "moral progress" not merely in intention but as a material outcome (Simon 1996) ? This is taken up in the following section on first order social design.
First Order Social Design
For Simon (1996) , configuring social organizations is critical in social design. First order design targets the social organization of design activity itself as the first object of design. This may also be called meta-design as it pertains to design of the very structures and resources designers intend to use in their work. Relative to social design projects, first order design may be said to be "constitutive design" (Dryzek 1996; Tribe 1973) , which is normative and practical in its aims. Normatively, it is about designing institutions -value-imbued cultural abstractions --and the "kind of world" designers intend to realize through the project, constituting themselves (and their successors) in the process as democratic citizens working to advance a certain notion of the common good. In the pragmatic sense, constitutive design is concerned with design of an "actionable form" (Bobrow and Dryzek 1987; Alexander 1964 ) -the governance mechanisms --necessary to influence and normalize actions (now and in the future) in light of the institutions identified. Importantly, by creating the actionable form, designers intend to institutionalize prescribed patterns of action (and deter proscribed ones) so that desired patterns will recur and be repeated by their successors in the future as well. The object of institutional design is not merely to activate but sustain designers in their role as citizens. However, and equally importantly, as Simon (1996) recognized, insofar as our ability to forecast the future is necessarily imperfect, the mechanisms designed must include in their provisions processes for revising the actionable form itself so as to not constrain successors in defining their own historically-contingent conception of the public good. There can be no guarantee of realizing desiderata now or later; designing the actionable form is at best an attempt by designers to increase the probability of hitting the target. Whatever assurance there is may lie with the governance processes and procedures designed into the form. These constitute the core of first order design, in the recognition that the essence of institutions lies in the "web of human relations and legitimated practices" they enable (Bolan 1996) .
First order design -which in itself is the collective's very first collective act --starts with the design of the institution or institutions that members, in their role as citizens, agree should guide their actions and interest conceptions. Adapted from March (1995) are constitutive questions that the collective may use to determine what their appropriate role and interest should be: What kind of persons are we? What kind of situation is this? What do persons like us do in a situation like this? In democratic environments, robust institutional design is not merely a pragmatic matter (whatever will work) but stems from norms and values with "moral resonance" (Goodin 1996) . In light of this, for social design initiatives, a reflexive collective would answer the first question by affirming their role as citizens committed to a certain conception of the common good. Designing the guiding institutions(s) to serve as normative provisions such that the designers are implicitly and/or explicitly informed in how they respond to the other two questions is the realm of first order social design. Concurrence on the first suggests the appropriate answer to the other two questions and frames the design of governance processes/procedures and structures, which render the guiding institutions actionable by eliciting "attention to the demands of citizenship" on an ongoing basis (March 1995) . Collective action, March reminds us, "is based on a combination of answers" to the constitutive questions.
How might designers set up governance mechanisms -processes and procedures and structures --for social design projects? Table 1 suggests some of design principles, guiding theory/theories, and design guidelines drawing on institutional design, liberal democratic, and governance research literatures. I follow Hevner et al., (2004), and Walls et al (1992) in formatting Table 1 . Design principles reflect general, normative under -standings of phenomena and are typically stated in a declarative form. Theory -or kernel theory (Walls et al., 1992 ) -refers to the theoretical underpinnings of principles. Design guidelines are practical, actionable derivatives of design principles. The principles, theories and guidelines offered are meant to be illustrative. Table 1 about here -- Simon (1996) notes that, in evolving social design projects, the "idea of final goals is inconsistent with our limited ability to foretell or determine the future" and suggests instead that designers try to "establish initial conditions for the next succeeding stage of action". I believe that, with such projects, probably the best that designers can bequeath are constitutive resources (values, norms, identities) that would recommend "initial conditions" for instrumental design activity going forward. Simon (1996) 's influence on IS design theorizing has been definitive and profound but has been limited to Chapter 5 ("The Science of Design: Creating the Artificial") of Sciences of the Artificial. The present paper may be seen as an addendum to the book's next chapter, Chapter 6 ("Social Planning"), which has received much less attention in the IS design corpus strikingly disproportionate to its originality and importance. My use of Simon here, in particular Chapter 6, is as a starting point. Social science research in disciplines such as sociology, policy analysis, and political philosophy add much that is valuable to Simon's insights, which stem largely from economics. Simon, for example, neglects the power of institutions in shaping actors and actions. His emphasis on problem representation is valid and important, but institutionalists and analysts of social movements, for example, note the importance of discourse in shaping representations. In choosing a representation, Simon argues, it is important to identify the "limiting resource". Institutions (and discourses they favor) prevailing in the design situation are themselves limiting resources in that they skew how actors frame a problem or even what gets framed as such. Simon neglects the collective side of action, nor does he connect social planning to citizenship and democracy. Overall, though, his legacy is remarkable, his power nowhere more evident than in his suggestion that, in evolving social projects, designers attempt to delineate the social organization of design as a critical step in social design projects. This fits well with institutional design thinking and, more generally, with democratic theorizing. My focus here on first order social design acknowledges the importance of Simon's recommendation for such undertakings.
--Insert

Conclusion
IS design theorizing constitutes an important strand in IS research and has been heuristically useful to study design in corporate environments, as evidenced by the growing number of IS design studies. It is less useful with social design projects. The ideas advanced here for such projects can, however, apply to the social side of IS design as well. For example, Walls et al., (1992) assert that design theories "must have two aspectsone dealing with the product and one dealing with the process of design". I note that analysts should attend to a third, one which is foundational to these two aspects: the institutional conditions under which processes and procedures, as also product specifications, identity and meaning are determined and enacted. Designers of social projects, in particular evolving IS like infrastructures, worry about institutionalizing the design as much as they worry about the design itself. For them, institutionalizing the design (so that operative parts of it are made secure from frequent change by linking those parts to (a) other highly-institutionalized elements in an effort to institutionalize them via processes of contagion (Zucker 1977) and (b) legal provisions such as service contracts and project by-laws) is an integral part of design work which, in their expansive view, importantly includes the design of such strategies and provisions. Such concerns are, of course, relevant to design of institutions and governance mechanisms themselves: if, as Simon (1996) recommends, designers should want to bequeath initial conditions to their successors, what steps should they take to institutionalize operative parts of first order design while leaving others free for revision?
Institutions(s) for Constituting the Collective Design institution(s) in light of three "constitutive" questions: What kind of persons are we? What kind of situation is this? What do persons like us do in a situation like this? (adapted from March 1995) . But anticipate "motivational complexity" (Goodin 1996) , given the (sociological) institutional model of actors as multiplyembedded entities who, as agents, may choose to enact their preferences (consequentialist logic) or their citizen role (logic of appropriateness) (Bellah et al., 1991; DiMaggio 1997; Meyer 1986 ). Actors and collectives may opt to combine the two logics in strategic ways too (March 1995) . Governance Processes/Procedures Design processes/procedures for governance/rulemaking, member socialization (means of endogenous social control for normalizing interest and action), conflict resolution/consensus-building, and participation/deliberation.
Governance Structures
Design governance structures for congruence between "constitutive" and "instrumental" design aspects of project.
Principles: Design for transparency, publicity, openness, civility, revisability (Goodin 1996; Pettit 2004; Rawls 1980 Rawls , 1996 . Theory/Theories: Processes critical in institutional design (Bolan 1996) . Guidelines: Design rules for revising rules (Bolan 1996) ; design structured procedures for participation, deliberation, inquiry and choice (Santos 1998) .
Principles: Match democratic means and ends Internal governance structure: composition of collective to be representative but small in size (under 10 members) to allow face-to-face interaction. External governance structure: Public oversight of "public" decisions key to a democratic polity. Theory/Theories: Small group size conducive to increased trust, cooperation, commitment, norm reinforcement (Ostrom 1998) . For large groups, alternative deliberative structures and procedures (e.g., Danish consensus conference method) may work. (Hamlett 2003) ; Public scrutiny is a critical exogenous social control mechanism for normalizing member action and interest (Galaskiewicz 1991; Rawls 1980 Rawls , 1996 . Guidelines: (internal) Keep collective size under 10; if larger, use alternative structures/procedures; (external) Empanel referees (elected officials, mass media) to incent prescribed actions and disincentivize proscribed ones
